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-I 
In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
STEVEN L. WEST, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
MILES N. ANDERSON, HAL AN-
DERSON, CLYDE ANDERSON, 
MALCOLM N. McKINNON, dba 
AMERICAN FUEL COMPANY, 
and CLYDE COX, 
Defendants and Appellants. , 
Case No. 8294 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT, 
STEVEN L. WEST 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
For the most part the respondent, Steven L. West, concurs 
in the Statement of Facts set forth in appellant's brief. How-
ever, in respect to the plaintiff's earning capacity, the statement 
is erroneous. On page 11, in the defendant's Statement of 
Facts and again on pages 39 and 40 in the argument, the 
defendants contend that the only evidence of the plaintiff's 
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loss of earning capacity was that in 1951 he made around 
$2,400.00 prospecting and hauling coal, and in 1952 he made 
around $2,600.00, and at the time of the accident he was earn-
ing $300.00 per month. Defendants state that there was no 
evidence in the record whatsoever that plaintiff was qualified 
or could earn an excess of $3{)0.00 per month. Such we submit 
is not the fact. With regard to Mr. West's 1951 earnings, he 
testified that he worked on and off for a period of about five 
months and that the rest of the time he was prospecting, 
which produced him no income (R-336). Mr. West further 
testified (R-334) that he could, and did, gross in some months 
as much as $800.00. His testimony also indicates that he could 
make four trips per week and make a net profit on each trip 
of $45.00. Even based upon three trips per week in which 
he would gross $60.00 per trip, or a total of $180.00, his 
expenses for the three trips being $45.00, Mr. West would 
net $135.00 per week, or an average of $540.00 per month. 
On redirect examination, (R-356), Mr. West made it clear 
that his gross salary was $300.00 per month and that out of 
the $300.00 his income taxes would be deducted. 
There are certain additional facts not contained in the 
defendant's statement of facts to which the plaintiff desires 
to call the attention of the Court. Exhibit P-4, reproduced 
in plaintiff's brief, distorts the distances and makes it appear 
that the truck was facing the position where Mr. West was 
injured. Exhibit P-7 and the defendant Cox's, testimony 
(R-186-190), more clearly and more accurately illustrates the 
relative positions of the truck, scoopmobile, and Mr. West. 
The defendant, Cox, testified that the truck "described an 
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arc," indicating that the wheels of the truck were cramped 
considerably to the left (R-208). At the time, the defendant 
Hal Anderson parked the truck, he did so under the direction 
of the defendant Cox (R-252-R-178). The defendant Cox 
saw Hal Anderson leave his truck after he had parked it and 
also saw him go down the canyon to his brother's truck. This 
he had seen before he started to load the truck (R-183-184 and 
R-190). The evidence also indicates that the defendant Cox 
knew where West was before he started to load the truck 
(R-196) and further, that he was looking at West while the 
truck was moving (R-215). The defendant Cox testified that 
he did not check the brakes (R-198). This evidence is un-
disputed. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE DEFENDANTS, MALCOLM McKINNON AND 
CLYDE COX, WERE GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE AS 
FOUND BY THE JURY BECAUSE CLYDE COX, IN 
LOADING A TRUCK UNATTENDED ON A GRADE 
WITH THE WHEELS TURNED IN A DOWN HILL DI-
RECTION, WAS NOT ENTITLED TO RELY UPON HAL 
ANDERSON HAVING SO SECURELY BRAKED THE 
TRUCK THAT IT WOULD NOT RUN DOWN HILL AND 
CAUSE GRAVE INJURY TO THE PLAINTIFF. 
POINT II 
THE PLAINTIFF, STEVEN WEST, WAS NOT GUlL TY 
OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER OF 
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LAW IN SITTING DOWN BY THE SIDE OF THE MAIN 
TRAVELED WAY ON A PILE OF COAL WITHOUT BE-
ING ATTENTIVE MERELY BECAUSE THE JURY FOUND 
CLYDE COX GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE, BECAUSE, THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE ACTS AND 
FAILURE TO ACT OF COX AND THE CIRCUMSTANCES 
SURROUNDING THE ACTS OF WEST WERE ENTIRELY 
DIFFERENT. 
POINT III 
THE INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN BY THE TRIAL COURT 
DO N 0 T OVER-ACCENTUATE THE PLAINTIFF'S 
THEORY, BECAUSE, SUCH INSTRUCTIONS WERE 
GIVEN TO ENABLE THE JURY TO ANSWER THE 
SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES SUBMITTED TO THEM. 
POINT IV 
THE SUBMISSION OF THE SPECIAL INTERROGA-
TORY TO THE JURY REGARDING THE LOSS OF EARN-
ING CAPACITY OF STEVEN L. WEST WAS PROPER 
BECAUSE THE TESTIMONY OF MR. WEST AND THE 
TESTIMONY OF THE DOCTOR WHO ATTENDED MR. 
WEST SUPPORTED THE SUBMISSION OF THE QUES-
TION OF LOSS OF YEARLY EARNING CAPACITY TO 
THE JURY. 
POINT V 
THE COURT'S INSTRUCTION, NUMBER 9 (a) RE-
GARDING THE RIGHT TO RELY ON DUE CARE OF 
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ANOTHER, AND NUMBER 12 REGARDING CIRCUM-
STANCES TO BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING 
ORDINARY CARE OF COX, ARE NOT CONTRADIC-
TORY INSTRUCTIONS BECAUSE CLYDE COX DID 
NOT HAVE AN ABSOLUTE RIGHT TO RELY UPON 
THE ASSUMPTION THAT HAL ANDERSON WOULD 
NOT BE NEGLIGENT, BUT COULD ONLY SO RELY 
UNTIL SOME ACT WAS DONE BY HAL ANDERSON 
TO INDICATE TO THE CONTRARY OR THE CIRCUM-
STANCES INDICATED THAT !IAL ANDERSON MIGHT 
BE NEGLIGENT. 
POINT VI 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN 
THE GIVING AND THE FAILURE TO GIVE THE IN-
STRUCTIONS COMPLAINED OF BY THE DEFENDANT 
BECAUSE IN SUBMITTING A CASE TO THE JURY ON 
SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES, ONLY SUCH INSTRUC-
TIONS AS WILL ENABLE THE JURY TO INTELLIGENT-
LY ANSWER THE INTERROGATORIES NEED BE GIVEN. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DEFENDANTS, MALCOLM McKINNON AND 
CLYDE COX, WERE GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE AS 
FOUND BY THE JURY BECAUSE CLYDE COX, IN 
LOADING A TRUCK UNATTENDED ON A GRADE 
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WITH THE WHEELS TURNED IN A DOWN HILL DI-
RECTION, WAS NOT ENTITLED TO RELY UPON HAL 
ANDERSON HAVING SO SECURELY BRAKED THE 
TRUCK THAT IT WOULD NOT RUN DOWN HILL AND 
CAUSE GRAVE INJURY TO THE PLAINTIFF. 
The defendants Malcolm N. McKinnon and Clyde Cox 
contend that they were not guilty of any negligence which 
was the proximate cause of the injury to the plaintiff. The 
defendants state on page 12 of their brief that, "the only 
issue raised by defendants' motion for a directed verdict is 
was there sufficient evidence to go to the jury on the issue of 
whether Clyde Cox was negligent by failing to ascertain that 
the dump truck was so securely braked or the wheels blocked, 
before starting to load it; and was he required to foresee that 
if this was not done, the truck would roll down hill and 
against and upon the plaintiff?' " This we submit is the pri-
mary question for the court to determine upon appeal. The 
defendants assert that if Steven West could assume the truck 
was securely braked that Clyde Cox was entitled to the same 
assumption. It is apparently the defendants position that Clyde 
Cox had the absolute right to rely upon the assumption that 
Hal Anderson would not be negligent and that there was 
nothing about the situation to give him notice to the contrary. 
The jury was instructed upon this proposition as follows: 
"9- (a) : You are further instructed that any person has 
a right to reply upon the assumption that other people 
will not be negligent unless and until some act is done 
by the other person to indicate to the contrary." 
Under the instruction, as given, in order to find that 
Clyde Cox was negligent by failing to ascertain that the dump 
10 
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truck was so securely braked or blocked that it would not run 
down hill while he was loading it, the jury must have found 
that there were some acts done by Hal Anderson which would 
indicate that he had not braked or blocked the truck. Several 
acts of substandard conduct existed which should have indi-
cated to Cox that some extra precaution should be taken. The 
truck was placed in his presence on a grade facing in a down-
hill direction. The wheels were also turned in a downhill 
direction and Hal Anderson immediately left the truck after 
he had parked it on the grade. While Clyde Cox stated that 
he didn't notice that the wheels were turned in a downhill 
direction (R-179), he did testify that the scoopmobile which 
he was operating was to the righthand side of the truck and 
had he looked, he would have been able to see that the wheels 
were turned in a downhill direction (R-1 79). Having failed 
to look, or failing to see, he is placed under the same obliga-
tion as though he had seen it. This one circumstance is suf-
ficent to put him on notice that Hal Anderson might have been 
negligent. Instruction 9- (a), as given, does not clearly and ac-
curately state the law, but the error, if any, was in favor of Cox 
and McKinnon, so they can't complain of it, and we submit 
that the appeal should be considered in the light of the law 
as it should have been given. Actually, a correct instruction 
on this phase of the law should have been given as follows: 
"You are further instructed that a person has the 
right to rely upon the assumption that other people will 
not be negligent when an ordinary prudent person 
would so assume. In determining whether an ordinary 
prudent person would assume that other people will 
not be negligent, you may take into consideration all 
the facts and circumstances of the stituation, the acts 
11 
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of failure to act of the third person and the class or 
type of person or persons involved." 
The essential distinctions between the instruction as given 
and as suggested are that rather than there be an absolute right 
to rely upon another's being non-negligent, that right exists 
only when an ordinary prudent man would so rely. And that, 
rather than the right to rely, continuing until some act is done 
by the third person to indicate the contrary, the indication 
may come through the static facts of the situation, any cir-
cumstances attendant, failure to act upon the part of third 
persons or the type or class of person being dealt with. These 
propositions are discussed at length later in this brief. 
In order to properly analyze the aforementioned rules, 
we should first consider the basic rules as to the "scope of 
duty" and the quantum of caution required in situations such 
as the case at bar. An excellent discussion of this matter is 
found in Flemming James' article in 3 Utah Law Review 275, 
entitled "Nature of Negligence." The essence of the article 
is that negligence is conduct which exposes another to an un-
reasonable risk of harm. The statement of the rule was ap-
proved by the Utah Supreme Court in the case of Hilliard t'S. 
Utah By-Products Company (Utah) 263 Pac. 2nd 287, page 
290, as follows: 
"One is guilty of negligence when 'he does such an 
act or omits to take such a precaution that under the 
circumstances present, as an ordinary prudent person, 
he ought to reasonably foresee that he will thereby ex-
pose the interest of another to an unreasonable risk of 
harm.' When one does so, he may be held liable for 
resulting injuries caused by any reasonably foreseeable 
12 
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conduct, whether it be innocent, negligent, or even 
criminal." 
The amount of caution required or an ordinary prudent 
person in any situation is measured by the following standards: 
( 1) The likelihood that the conduct will injure others, taken 
with ( 2) the seriousness of the harm threatened and balanced 
against ( 3) the interest which must be sacrificed to avoid the 
risk. 
Fleming James in his article in 3 Utah Law Review 281-2 
sets forth these standards as follows: 
"1. The amount of caution required tends to increase 
with the likelihood that the actor's conduct will injure 
others." 
2. "The amount of caution required tends to increase 
with the seriousness of the injury, if it happens." 
3·. "The interest which must be sacrificed to avoid the 
risk is balanced against the danger." 
We can measure the amount of caution required of Cox 
in this case to fulfill his duty to West by applying the fore-
going standards. The truck was parked facing down hill with 
its wheels turned downhill, and in the direction of Steve West. 
It was there to be loaded with coal out of a scoopmobile. The 
loading operation tends to jostle the truck. Hal Anderson, the 
driver, had left, prior to the time Cox started to load. All 
these things Cox actually knew or was legally bound to have 
known. To state that it is unlikely that the truck would break 
loose is to ignore a human experience. Trucks and motor 
vehicles can and frequently do break away and run down hill 
when parked upon a hill. The defendants concede on page 
13 
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27 of their brief that: "The probability of the truck rolling 
forward if not properly braked was obvious to any one in the 
vicinity." The likelihood therefore that Cox's conduct in load-
ing the truck without checking to see that it was properly 
braked would result in injury to another if for any reason 
whatever it broke loose was exceptionally high. The instru-
mentality being dealt with was a large heavy truck being made 
heavier ton by ton by Cox. It is obvious to anyone that if such 
an instrumentality were to run against a man or go over him, 
the harm to him would be great and serious. "The seriousness 
of the injury, if it happened" was tremendous and frightening 
and anyone could see that it would be, if it happened. The 
"interest which must be sacrificed to avoid the risk" was small 
indeed. Cox needn't have gotten out of the scoopmobile. He 
could have called to Hal Anderson to check his brakes and 
block the wheels. This would have been no inconvenience 
and would have sacrificed no interest. He could have gotten 
out of the scoopmobile and tugged once on the brakes to test 
them or told Hal Anderson to turn his wheels up hill. None 
of these things would have required more than a moment or 
two or much effort. There would have been little or no in-
convenience or expense to Cox to exercise some additional 
precaution under the facts of this case. 
The defendants take the view that Cox was unfamiliar 
with the truck's mechanism, that modern trucks are compli-
cated and that the average person wouldn't know whether or 
not it was braked. The defendants further assert on page 14 of 
their brief that the emergency brake would have no effect 
on the movement of the truck's rear wheels. Such contentions 
14 
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are not in accordance with the facts or with reason. There is 
no evidence in the record that the emergency brake would not 
operate if the vacuum leaked out of the Eaton two-speed rear 
axle as contended by the defendant. Hal Anderson, in his 
testimony (R-281), when asked about the emergency brake, 
testified as follows: 
"Q When you say you pulled the brakes on what 
brake do you mean? 
A The emergency brake. 
Q How is that operated? 
A Just with a lever. 
There is some other evidence in the record with regard 
to the ratchet on the brake of the truck; however, there was 
no conclusive evidence from which the jury might have be-
lieved that the ratchet was defective. We submit that it is 
wholly unreasonable to conclude that Clyde Cox, if he had 
checked, would not have know whether the truck was properly 
braked. On the contrary, there is some evidence in the record 
from which the jury could have concluded that Cox did know 
how to operate a truck. When being questioned by Mr. 
Wooley with regard to the operation of the scoopmobile 
(R-206), Mr. Cox testified as follows: 
"Q. And operate it ( refering to the scoopmobile) 
much like you do a truck ? 
A: Yes, sir." 
In applying James' analysis to th facts as they existed 
m this case, we contend that a very substantial amount of 
caution was required on the part of Cox in order to avoid 
15 
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having his conduct be such that it would involve an unreason-
able risk of harm to. West. It is in the light of this very high 
duty that the question whether Cox's acts or failure to act 
constituted negligence must be considered. 
The jury found that Cox was negligent by failing to 
ascertain that the dump truck was so securely braked or blocked 
that it would not run down hill. while being loaded. And they 
found that that was a proximate cause of \Vest's injury. The 
inquiry then must be whether or not Cox had any duty to 
ascertain that the dump rtuck was securely braked so that it 
would not run down hill while he was loading it. This ques-
tion must in turn be examined in the light of whether or not 
Cox is entitled, under circumstances of the case as they existed 
at the time he started to load the truck, to rely upon the propo-
sition that Hal Anderson had braked the truck properly and 
that it would not run down hill. The defendants contend that 
they had such right to rely and they base said contention pri-
marily upon the proposition that if West, the plaintiff, was 
entitled to assume that the truck was properly braked that 
Cox is entitled to the same assumption. With regard to West's 
right to rely we will _discuss that proposition at a later point 
in the brief. We come to the portion of Mr. James' article 
dealing with the obligation to take into account conditions and 
conduct of others. The following is his discussion of the exact 
point: 
"E. The Obligation to Take Into Account the Con-
ditions and the Conduct of Others. 
When men live together in society, even the most 
selfish of them must regulate their lives to a very 
great extent on the basis of how they expect other 
16 
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people to act. And naturally enough in determining 
whether any given conduct involves an unreasonable 
risk of harm, the reasonably forseeable conduct of 
others which may affect the consequences of the actor's 
conduct should be considered. This is the general rule. 
It remains to examine some special applications of it 
and some vestigial limitations upon it in practice. 
The case where the conduct of the other person 
(i.e., other than the actor whose conduct is being 
judged) is itself that of a normal, reasonably prudent 
adult, gives no trouble at all. Such conduct the actor 
is bound to take into account if under the circumstances 
of the case it is reasonably foreseeable. Thus the manu-
facturer of an automobile in order to be in the exercise 
of due care must foresee that it is likely to be driven 
along public highways without the detection and repair 
of a latent defect. 
The obligation to regulate one's conduct with a 
view to other people's disabilities and their substandard 
conduct should stand no differently. People generally 
do take extra precautions when they drive past a crowd 
of young children playing by the roadside, or when 
they see an aged and infirm pedestrian crossing the 
street. They do realize that other drivers often pull out 
from the curb without looking for traffic, and that they 
sometimes fail to yield the right of way or keep on 
going after a traffic light has turned red against them, 
and they drive with a view to these hazards. They do 
lock houses and automobiles and secure valuables 
against the possibility of theft, and so on. There are 
several types of situations where this notion has been 
applied, and for mere convenience of treatment they 
may be divided as follows: 
1. Where something specific about the situation 
gives notice of the likelihood of the other person's dis-
ability or his substandard conduct. The first two ex-
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amples given in the last paragraph are of that kind. 
So also are those cases where the nature of the place 
(e.g., playgrounds), or signs, proclaim the probability 
that children or blind people, or the like, will be pres-
ent. And of course the other person's conduct may often 
show his infirmity to one who has eyes to see. 
2. Where the actor's conduct (including omissions 
and also such things as the maintenance of premises 
or highways) is likely to affect an indeterminate number 
of people, among whom there will in all probability 
be some children, some aged and infirm people, some 
pregnant woman, some foreigners who do not know 
the language or the customs of the country, and the 
like. In such situations, if the imputation of negligence 
is to be avoided, some account must be taken of reason-
ably foreseeable deviations like those mentioned. But 
such general likelihood does not call for as much in 
the way of precautions as do the situations mentioned 
in the previous paragraph. 
When the other person's conduct involves negligence 
or a crime, there are certain notions which sometimes 
impede the full application of the foregoing rational 
principle. It is often said that an actor may assume that 
others will act lawfully and carefully. Rightly under-
stood this is sound enough, and no more than a corollary 
of the general principle. As a broad generalization, 
people probably do obey the law, so that unlawful 
conduct is more or less deviational and unusual. In 
many situations, therefore, the assumption mentioned 
no more than reflects the real factual probabilities 
as to what another person's conduct will be. If the 
assumption is made only in cases where it reflects the 
facts, it is useful and proper. But in this connection two 
things must be noted. The first is that such an assump-
tion does not always correspond to the facts. It does 
not in situations where a law is generally disobeyed. 
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It does not where the facts in a specific case would 
show to a reasonable man in the actor's position 
that another person will probably disobey the law this 
time. And it does not wherever the actor's conduct 
exposes some interest to risk from a large and indeter-
minate group of people which will probably include 
some who will be negligent or commit crime, so that 
the likelihood of some negligence or some crime is 
considerable, though the number of those who will 
be responsible for it is relatively small. The second 
thing to be noted is that the assumption has often 
been applied rather mechanically, without any real 
regard to the factual probabilities of the situation. 
Perhaps the most siginficant trend that has taken place 
in this particular field, in recent years, has been the 
increasing liberalization in allowing the wrongs of other 
people to be regarded as foreseeable where the facts 
warrant that conclusion if they are looked at naturally 
and not thorugh the lens of some artificial archaic 
notion. 
Subject to the qualifications just mentioned, situations 
where the probable negligence or crime of another is 
to be taken into account in evaluating conduct, fall into 
classifications parallel to those mentioned above with 
respect to the infirmities of others: 
3. Where something specific about the situation gives 
notice of the likelihood of the other person's probable 
negligence or crime." 
Prosser on Tarts, Hornbook Series, pages 243 to 249 
inclusive, has a well-documented discussion relative to antici-
pating the conduct of others. The cases supporting the follow-
ing propositions are referred to in the article and the following 
extractions give the substance of the conclusions: 
"There are many situations in which the hypothetical 
reasonable man would be expected to anticipate and 
19 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
guard against the conduct of others. Anyone with 
normal experience is required to have knowledge of 
the traits and habits of common animals, and of other 
human beings, and to govern himself accordingly. * * * 
he is required to realize that there will be a certain 
amount of negligence in the world. In general, where 
the· risk is relatively slight, he is free to proceed upon 
the assumption that other people will exercise proper 
care * * * But when the risk becomes a serious one, 
either because the threatened harm is great, or because 
there is an especial likelihood that it will occur, rea-
sonable care may demand precautions against that 
occasional negligence which is one of the ordinary in-
cidents of human life and, therefore, to be anticipated." 
To restrict the rule that one must contemplate the pos-
sibility of negligence on the part of a third person to a situation 
where some act or that person puts the actor on notice of the 
third person's disposition to be negligent, is to restrict the rule 
improperly. 
The static facts of a situation may, by themselves, be suf-
ficient to give a reasonable man warning that he must con· 
template the possibility of negligence on the part of others. 
The trial court instructed the jury in Instruction No. 12 
in part as follows: 
"Clyde Cox as an employee owed Steve L. West 
a duty to use reasonable care to avoid harming him. 
That is to say, Clyde Cox was under an obligation to 
conduct himself in reference to his business invitees 
as a reasonably prudent man would do under the same 
or similar circumstance." 
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah in the early 
case of Downey vs. Gemini Mining Co., (Utah) 24 P. 431, 68 
P. 413, defined ordinary care as follows: 
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"Ordinary care simply implies and includes the ex-
ercise of such reasonable diligence, care, skill, watch-
fulness, and forethought as, under all of the circum-
stances of the particular case a careful prudent man 
or officer of a corporation would exercise under the 
same or similar circumstances. And by the term 'same 
circumstances' is meant to include all the circumstances 
of time, place, and attendant conditions." 
Again our Court reaffirms that the jury may consider more 
than just the "acts of the third person." 
38 Am fur. 667 Section 24, provides: 
"The probability of injury by one to the legally pro-
tected interests of another is the basis for the law's 
creation of a duty to avoid such injury. Every person 
is under a duty to exercise his senses and intelligence 
in his actions in order to avoid injury to others, and 
where a situation suggests investigation and inspection 
in order that its dangers may fully appear, the duty 
to make such investigation and inspection is imposed 
by law." 
In the case at bar Cox was about to load a large truck 
parked with wheels turned down hill on a hill. It had been 
left there by a boy not quite 16 years of age who got out of 
the truck after having left the wheels pointed down hill and 
immediately left the truck to go down to talk to his brother. 
Here, we submit, a reasonable man should be required to 
contemplate that the truck might roll forward when it was 
being loaded if it had been improperly braked. In view of 
the seroiusness of the injury which would be caused were it 
to roll forward, Cox could be held by a jury to have the af-
firmative duty to ascertain that the brakes were firmly set in 
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such a manner that the truck would not roll forward when 
he commenced to load it. 
The class of persons with whom one is dealing may be 
sufficient in and of itself to put one on notice that some of 
those persons may be negligent. The outstanding example 
of this is a case where one is dealing with children. One must 
contemplate that children may act without any care for their 
own safety. Similarly we contend that Cox was required to 
contemplate the possibility that a sixteen year old boy might 
not act with the amount of caution which an ordinary prudent 
grown man would use under the circumstances there attendant. 
The acts of third persons are a third class of cases which 
would put a reasonable prudent man upon notice that the third 
person might be negligent. Such acts as leaving a truck un-
attended and turning the wheels down hill toward the plaintiff 
when it is parked on a hill are such acts which a jury could 
properly find to be sufficient to put a reasonable man upon 
notice that the person doing those acts might be negligent. 
The Restatement of the Law of Torts deals with the rule 
in situations such as those present in this case. The following 
are portions of the Restatement, paragraph by paragraph, 
with the facts applied to the situation which are sufficient to 
support the jury's findings and the judgment entered upon it. 
Restatement, Torts, Sec. 302: 
"i. Action of human beings. Whether the actor as a 
reasonable man is entitled to expect that human beings 
will exercise the amount of attention, foresight, care, 
and skill which persons of their class customarily ex-
ercise in similar conditions depends upon a variety of 
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factors. If the actor knows or should know that the 
safety of the situation which he has created depends 
upon the actions of a particular person or a particular 
class of persons, he is required to take into account their 
peculiar characteristics of inattention, carelessness, un-
skillfulness, or even recklessness if he knows or should 
know thereof." 
Cox knew or should have known that the safety of the 
situation with which he was dealing depended upon the actions 
of Hal Anderson. The situation which Cox created was the 
application of active force tending to push the truck down 
hill where the truck was standing unattended on a hill ·with the 
wheels pointed in a downhill direction toward the plaintiff. 
He certainly knew or would be required to know that the 
safety of the situation thus created depended entirely upon 
whether or not Hal Anderson had behaved with every reason-
able care. Under the circumstances he, under the rules stated 
above, is required to take into account the particular character-
istics of inattention, carelessness, or unskillfulness of the 
third person if he knows or should know thereof. Cox knew 
of Hal's inattention because he saw that Hal had left the 
truck and was paying no attention whatever to it. He knew 
or should have known that Hal was careless because he saw 
or should have seen that Hal had left the wheels on the truck 
turned in a downhill direction. He knew or should have known 
that Hal Anderson may be unskilled because he knew or could 
see that Hal was a young man of approximately 16 years of age. 
Restatement, Torts,· Section 302: 
"j. Irrespective of the actor's knowledge of the pe-
culiar propensities of particular persons or classes of 
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persons, he is required to know that there is a certain 
p~rcentage of all human beings which acts with less 
than normal propriety. Unless the interest at stake is 
valuable, the actor may be entitled to ignore the slight 
risk of harm to others involved in such propensities 
and to assume that human beings will act with normal 
propriety. If the actor knows or should realize that the 
situation is one which, if improperly interfered with, 
involves serious chance of grave harm to valuable in-
terests of others, he is required to take this chance into 
account and provide against it, particularly if his con-
duct is of little or no utility." 
The above comment should be analyzed with the realiza-
tion that the "interest at stake" is of tremendous value. The 
interest being the life and limb of Steven West, because cer-
tainly ~nder the situation as seen by Cox, the person whose 
interest stood in the greatest peril was Steve West and the 
interest which stood in that peril was his life. Certainly Cox 
knew or should realize that the situation there present was 
one which, if improperly interferred with, involves serious 
chance of grave harm to valuable interest of others. It is true 
that the conduct of C6x in loading the truck was conduct hav-
ing substantial utility but offset against the substantial utility 
is the consideration that it would have taken so little time 
and so little effort to have done the things which would have 
made the situation safe. 
Restatement, Torts, Section 302: 
"1. Anticipation of third person's negligence. The 
actor is often required to anticipate and provide against 
that occasional negligence which is one of the ordinary 
incidents of human life and therefore to be anticipated, 
particularly if there is little or no utility in the creation 
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of the situation and the harm likely to be done is· 
something more than trivial." 
The defendants cite Restatement of the Law of Torts, Neg-
ligence, Section (e) page 17, in support of their proposition 
that the defendant Cox had no duty to anticipate that the truck 
might roll down hill. Properly analyzed this rule is applicable 
to the case at bar but does not support the plaintiff's propo-
sition. It sets forth the rule that an actor is entitled to assume 
that human beings and animals will act and that natural forces 
will operate in their usual manner. This portion of the rule 
is not applicable, however, if, first, the actor had reason to 
expect the contrary or, secondly, that the action would create 
a serious chance of grave harm to same valuable interest, i.e., the 
life of Steve West, and there is little utility in the actor's con-
duct such as the ease of checking the brakes. Referring to the 
first exception, i.e., where the actor has reason to expect to 
the contrary, we submit, that under Instruction 9 (a) as it was 
given to the jury, they must have come to the conclusion that 
some act on the part of Hal Anderson put Cox on notice to 
the contrary and that he might act in a negligent manner. 
The defendants cite the case of Hilliard vs. Utah By-
Products. Company (Utah) 1 2nd 287, 263 Pac. 2nd 287, as 
being particularly applicable to the evidence in this case, not 
only as to whether Cox should have foreseen the negligent 
conduct on the part of Hal Anderson in parking the truck 
but also his duty to foresee that the plaintiff would not exercise 
reasonable care for his own safety. The Hilliard case is not 
in point on the facts. It involves the foreseeability of an in-
tervening actor. That case might throw some light on the 
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duty and foreseeability with regard to Hal Anderson, how-
ever, that matter is not involved in this appeal. 
The case of Mehl vs. Carter, (Kan.) 237 Pac. 2nd 240, 
cited by the defendants with regard to the question of fore-
seeability, cannot be in point in this case. The facts are entirely 
different and shed no light upon the problem to be determined 
with regard to the question of foreseeability. 
We must determine as to whether or not it is necessary 
that Cox be given specific notice of the exact manner in which 
the accident may take place. It is not required that one foresee 
the exact manner in which harm actually comes to the person 
injured. The test of foreseeability is that the person harmed 
may be within the general class to whom such harm is threat-
ened and that the harm which results be of the general class 
of harm which may be expected to result. The sequence of'" 
events by virtue of which the harm results need not be fore-
seeable. This is set out by Harper in 7 Notre Dame Law Review 
468 in his article "Foreseeability Factor in the Law of Torts" 
as follows: 
"The courts for centuries persisted in stating and 
purporting to apply the 'natural and the probable' 
formula to determine whether consequences were proxi-
mate to conduct. Many still insist that there can be no 
recovery if the injuries complained of were not rea-
sonably foreseeable. It would be most astonishing 
that such a formula should persist for so long if there 
were no validity whatever to it. The secret is revealed 
by the frequent qualification of the rule that the exact 
manner in which he injuries occurred need not be fore-
seeable. The explanation is that the courts are perfectly 
accurate in declaring that there can be no liability where 
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the injuries were unforeseeable, if 'foreseeability' re· 
fers to the general type of harm sustained. It is perfectly 
true that there is no liability for in juries or damage that 
falls entirely outside the general threat of harm which 
made the conduct of the actor negligent. The sequence 
of events, of course, need not be foreseeable. The 
manner in which the risk culminates in harm may be 
unusual, improbable, and highly unexpectable, from 
the point of view of the actor, at the time of his con-
duct. And yet, if the general result suffered falls within 
the danger area, there may be liability, providing to 
other requisites of legal causation are present. 
It should be observed that while non-liability for 
harm is completely outside the general threat is a 
correct statement of the results, to catch the rule in 
terms of legal causation is not a desirable analysis of 
he problem. It is rather a lack of analysis. Legal causa-
tion is better confined solely to the problem presented 
by the sequence of events leading up to the injury. 
Where the actor's liability is predicated upon his negli-
gent conduct, the question of whether the harm sus-
tained falls within or outside the general class of harms 
which made the conduct negligent may be treated 
more conveniently as an aspect of the negligence 
problem, and it has been so treated by the American 
Law Institute in its Restatement of Negligence." 
The defendants contend that in the two years Clyde Cox 
had been loading coal that this was the first time that a truck 
had ever moved from its moorings and rolled down a hill 
and that therefore the defendant had no duty to anticipate 
and foresee that such would be the case. There is no evi-
dence in the record that Cox had ever loaded a truck under 
the same circumstances as he did in the instant case. It takes 
no great amount of insight to foresee that a truck loaded 
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under these circumstances might run away and not being 
driven by anyone could result in great harm. The general re-
sult suffered in this case, i.e.: the injuries to Steve West, we 
submit, falls within the danger area and was reasonably fore-
seeable. 
The Supreme Court of the State of Texas, in the case of 
Humble Oil & Refining Company, et al vs. Martinet al (Texas) 
222 S. W. 2nd 995, considered a factual situation almost on all 
fours with the case at bar. In that case the petitioner Humble 
operated a filling station which was located on an incline of 
about 6 inches per 27 feet. The owner of the automobile, a 
Mrs. Love, parked her car in the service station to obtain 
service by Humble and with the latter's actual knowledge and 
consent and left the car unattended on a sloping drive. The 
court held Humble to be liable to persons who were injured 
when the car rolled down the drive. The court held in part as 
follows: 
"It seems proper that the operator of a filling station 
should owe to that part of the public which might be 
affected-such as resopndent Martin here-the duty 
of ordinary care to prevent cars left with it under such 
circumstances from rolling away and injuring persons 
or property. If there were any doubt about this in the 
ordinary case, there could hardly be any in a situation 
like the present, in which both the possibility of such 
an accident and the probability of serious results there-
from were obvious. If, to take an extreme example, 
the station employee, Manis, had been otherwise un-
occupied and standing close by Mrs. Love's car in a 
position where he could readily and with safety to 
himself have stopped it but, after seeing it start, had 
yet made no effort to stop it, there could be little doubt 
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that such conduct would constitute actionable negli-
gence on Humble's part toward the publiC. Similarly, 
if Mrs. Love had been a stranger visiting the station 
for the first time and with the previous knowledge of 
the station employees, had left her car unoccupied 
and unbraked beside the pumps, so that it later rolled 
away, it seems plain that Humble ought to be respon-
sible for the consequences to innocent third persons. 
These examples illustrate the existence of the duty of 
the station operator to the public and also the corollary 
proposition that the operator is not free to omit pre-
caution or effort simply because the particular car 
in question is brought onto the premises by its owner 
or happens to escape before the station operator has 
taken physical control of it. They do not, however, 
throw much light on the problem of the quantum of 
care or precaution necessary to meet the standard of 
reasonable prudence. 
As to the latter question, undoubtedly the peculiar 
physical characteristic of the station, all of which must 
be taken as a matter of law to be well known to 
Humble, have a legitimate bearing, and as a result, 
we think the amount of care should plainly be greater 
than, for example, in the case of a station located in 
a flat area and without sloping driveways. Should 
authority be needed to support such a conclusion, it 
has been held in Texas and elsewhere that, under the 
so-called rule of res ipsa loquitur, evidence that a 
defendant's car was parked by him in a heavily sloping 
street and thereafter rolled down without a driver, 
damaging the plaintiff's person or property, was suf-
ficient to carry the case to the jury on the issue of the 
defendant's negligence, even though the only other 
evidence on the point was direct evidence by the de-
fendant or others that the emergency brake was care-
fully set at the time the car was parked. Ketchum v. 
Gillespie, Tex. Civ. App., 145 S. W. 2nd 215; Glaser v. 
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Schroeder, 269 Mass. 337, 168 N. E. 809. While we 
do not consider the present care one of res ipsa loquitur 
or other rule of circumstantial evidence in so far as 
the liability of petitioner Humble is concerned, the 
decisions mentioned do necessarily imply that the 
matter of leaving a car on a sloping way is one in which 
the ordinarily prudent man would be expected to take 
a greater amount of precaution than otherwise. As-
suming that in the instant case the station employee, 
Manis, were unoccupied at the time Mrs. Love left her 
car in the pump area, knew she had herself taken no 
precautions to keep the car stationary and yet stood 
idly by in his office for even two or three minutes, we 
think there would be a serious question as to whether 
Humble would not be gulty of negligence as a matter 
of law. This, because his knowledg_e would, by all 
reasonable standards, call for quicker action than might 
otherwise be required. The only differences between 
such a situation and the instant case are, first, that in 
the latter Manis might conceivably have been justified 
in relying on Mrs. Love herself to take the necessary 
precautions; and, secondly, that Manis was evidently 
occupied with servicing another car at the pumps and 
other successive duties from the time Mrs. Love left 
her car until it rolled away. 
As to the first difference, while Mrs. Love was a 
regular customer of the station, understood the necessity 
of securing her car and was negligent in failing to 
secure it, we cannot say that as a matter of law, Manis 
exercised sufficient care in the discharge of his duty 
to the public by simply assuming she had secured it. 
A plaintiff injured when standing close to a public 
street without keeping a lookout, is not, as a matter 
of law, to be acquitted of contributory negligence be-
cause he assumes that the defendant's oncoming car 
will be driven with due care and will therefore not 
strike him. Cronk v. ]. G. Pegues Motor Co., Tex. Civ. 
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App., 167 S. W. 2d 254, writ ref. w. o. m. And there 
is distinction between the general axiom that a person 
is not bound to anticipate the negligence of others 
and the idea that one may always discharge a duty 
of due care to the public by relying on performance 
by another of the same duty owed by the latter. Mrs. 
Love did not indicate to Manis that she had secured 
or intended to secure the car, and we think any implied 
reliance by him upon her doing so was merely a cir-
cumstance to be considered by the jury on the issue 
of negligence. 
Nor can we say, as a matter of law, that the circum-
stance of Manis being busy with other matters at the 
time shows him to have discharged his duty of due 
care. It was clearly not very difficult for him to have 
interrupted his other work for the brief time an in-
spection would require. The jury might well have 
thought it a more urgent matter to make this inspection 
than to collect for· soft drinks purchased by customers, 
or do several other things he appears to have done be-
fore the car rolled away. Plainly any unfavorable 
consequences of interrupting these latter duties would 
be less serious than those of a failure to inspect an 
unguarded car. As to the matter of just how much 
time elapsed between the moment Mrs. Love left her 
car and the moment it rolled away, while the prepon-
derance of the evidence does indicate that this period 
was rather short, we cannot say as a matter of law 
that it was only "two or three minutes" as testified to 
by Manis. His estimate was at best an estimate and, 
coming from him as an employee of the defendant 
Humble and one who might himself be responsible 
in the premises, need not be taken as conclusive, while 
at the same time there is at least some evidence from 
the various other winesss indicating that a considerably 
greater period of time might have elapsed. In any 
event the period is itself not conclusive one way or the 
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other. If with his knowledge that the car was left on 
the sloping lane, it- was reasonable for Manis to forego 
an inspection for two or three minutes, it was doubt-
less reasonable for him to do so for a still longer time. 
On the· other hand, we think the jury might properly 
have considered even two or three minutes too long 
a delay under the circumstances. The point was merely 
evidentiary and no more the proper subject of a special 
issue than, for example, the question of just what other 
duties Manis was in fact performing during the period. 
Other contentions (by .both petitioners) stem from 
an apparent confusion in the jury findings to the effect 
that, while Mrs. Love negligently failed to set the 
emergency brake (she admitted failing to set it), she 
nevertheless did "properly place the gears of her car 
in reverse" (as she--and she alone--testified) when 
she left it. The jury also found upon sufficient evidence 
that the gears were not in defective condition. An ap-
parently impartial witness testified rather convincingly 
that when he examined the car immediately after it 
stopped in respondent Martin's yard, the gear was in 
the neutral position. The evidence does not admit of 
any theory of the accident such as the meddling of a 
third party or the intervention of any force other than 
gravity. If the car were left in reverse gear, it seems 
clear that neither Humble nor Mrs. Love would be 
liable. It is common knowledge that such a procedure 
is quite as safe a method of securing a car as setting 
the emergency brake, and that cars in reverse gear do 
not roll on grades such as that prevailing at and even 
beyond the place where the Love car undoubtedly was 
left. Mrs. Love could not be negligent if she took an 
obviously sufficient precaution, and if she did take it, 
the failure of Humble to inspect was not the proximate 
cause of the accident, nor was its failure to take other 
precautions negligence. The Court of Civil Appeals 
considered that, under the circumstances, the finding 
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that the car was left in reverse was "almost incredible." 
Without the least reflection upon the good faith of 
Mrs. Love, we more than agree with this view and 
think this Co~ut is not bound by the finding or Mrs. 
Love's statement, which is its only support, her testi-
mony being in our judgment at variance with elemen-
tal physical facts and common knowledge and so not 
evidence, regardless of the good faith of the witness. 
Seilwell v. Hines, 273 Pa. 259, 116 A, 919, 21 A.L.R. 
139; Austin v. Neiman, Tex. Com. App., 14 S. W. 2d 
794, 20 Am. Jur., Evidence, Sec. 1183. This conclusion 
disposes of the only serious contention of petitioner 
Humble with respect to its negligence not being a pmxi-
mate cause of the accident." (Underli?ing added.) 
The parallel between the factual situation in the Humble 
case and the case at bar is noteworthy. In the Humble case 
Mrs. Love had come to purchase gasoline; in the case at bar, 
Hal Anderson was present on the premises as an independent 
contractor of the Eastern Utah Development Company to 
purchase coal from McKinnon doing business as the Ameri-
can Fuel Company. In both cases the motor vehicle ran 
down a hill after it was left unattended by the driver of 
the motor vehicle. In the Humble case the service station 
opertaor knew that Mrs. Love had left the automobile there 
and had apparently consented thereto. In the case at bar, 
Cox saw Hal Anderson leave the truck and made no protest 
but proceeded to load the truck. In the Humble case the car 
escaped before the station operator had taken physical con-
trol of it. In the case at bar, there is even a stronger indication 
that Cox had some duty because he was interfering with the 
truck by loading large loads of coal into the body of the truck. 
In the Humble case, the Humble Oil Company contended that 
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their employee Manis had a right to rely upon the fact that 
Mrs. Love had secured the automobile. Here Cox contends 
he is entitled to rely upon the fact that Hal Anderson had 
secured the truck. The jury in the Humble case found that Mrs. 
Love had left the car in gear; however, the Court of Appeals 
considered that under the circumstances such finding was 
almost incredible and was at variance with elemental physical 
facts. In the case at bar, the jury found that Hal Anderson 
was negligent in failing to set the brakes securely on the dump 
truck. In both cases· the defendants contended that any act 
done by them was not the proximate cause of the accident. 
The only possible distinction between the two cases is the 
question of custody and control of the motor vehicles. However, 
if such distinction makes any difference we submit that the 
defendant Cox cannot make such a claim. 
The issues were submitted to the jury on special interro-
gatories pursuant to Rule 49 (a) U.R.C.P. The defendant did 
not ask that the issue as to control of the truck be submitted 
to the jury, and the Court omitted such issue of fact. The rule 
provides in part: 
''The court shall give to the jury such explanation 
and instruction concerning the matter thus submitted 
as may be necessary to enable the jury to make its find-
ings upon each issue. If in so doing the court omits any 
issue of fact raised by the pleadings or by the evidence, 
each party waives his right to trial by jury of the issue 
so omitted unless before the jury retires he demands its 
submission to the jury. 
As to the issue of control the court made no finding, how-
ever, the rule further provides: 
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"As to an issue omitted without such demand the 
court may make a finding; or, if it fails to do so, it 
shall be deemed to have made a finding in accord with 
the judgment on a special verdict." 
In view of this rule, we submit that the court has found 
that Cox was in control and custody of the truck at the time 
that he commenced to load it, and this is based upon the fact 
that Hal Anderson had left the truck unattended and nobody 
else was in the area. The reasoning of the Texas Supreme 
Court, in the Humble case alone, is sufficient to sustain the 
finding of the jury that Cox was negligent. 
A Utah case throwing light on this general area and 
holding the problem of negligence and cause to be for the 
jury where the question is whether one must anticipate that 
others may be negligent is Shafer vs. Keeley Ice Cream Co., 
65 U. 46, 234 P. 300, 38 A.L.R. 1523. 
The precise question is whether the court may say as a 
matter of law that Cox was not negligent, under all of the 
circumstances present, in loading without checking the brakes 
or whether it is a questoin to be left to the jury. The rule is 
stated generally in the recent case of Best vs. Huber (Utah), 
281 Pac. 2nd 208, as follows: 
"It has been frequently announced by this court 
that negligence is a question for the jury unless all 
reasonable men must draw the same conclusion from 
the facts as they are shown. Shafer v. Keeley Ice Cream 
Co., 65 Utah 46, 234 P. 300, 38 A.L.R. 1523; Lowe 
v. Salt Lake City, 13 Utah 91, 44 P. 1050, 57 Am. St. 
Rep. 708; Baker v. Decker, 117 Utah 15, 212 P.2d 
679. As was said in Linden v. Anchor Min. Co., 20 
Utah 134, 58 P. 355, '3~58: 
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" 'Where there is uncertainty as to the existence of 
either negligence or contributory negligence, the ques-
tion is not one of law, but of fact, and to be settled 
by a jury; and this whether, the uncertainty arises from 
a conflict in the testimony, or because, the facts being 
undisputed, fair-minded men will honestly draw dif-
ferent conclusoins from them.' " 
In discussing the general rule that a person has a right 
to presume that every other person will perform his duty, 
the Supreme Court of the State of California, in the case of 
Dickinson vs. Pacific Greyhound Lines (Calif) 131 Pac. (2nd) 
401, at page 403 held: 
"Whether reasonable care is used under the cir-
cumstances in any particular case in relying upon the 
presumption, is a question for the jury." 
It appears to us that under the circumstances present 
in this case, the jury may well hold that a reasonably prudent 
man would not have relied upon Hal Anderson's being free 
from negligence but would instead, being alerted by the un-
usual circumstances present and by the tender age of Anderson, 
take some additional precautions such as blocking or braking 
the truck. This is what they did in fact hold. 
When it is seen that the true rule is not that "one has an 
absolute right to rely upon the freedom from negligence of 
another until some affirmative act upon the other's part gives 
him specific notice that the other person is not doing the thing 
which he should," but instead, the same old rule that one must 
behave as a reasonable man would under the circumstances, 
it is apparent the jury's verdict can be sustained and that the 
judgment entered upon it is proper. Whether these facts were 
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sufficient to give a reasonable man notice is p~rely a question 
for the jury. If there is in fact a fair, proper and lawful 
theory sustaining the verdict and the judgment, it is the duty 
of the court to allow the verdict to stand as given and not to 
disturb the judgment entered upon it. There is such a proper 
theory sustaining the verdict and the judgment. In view of 
this, the court should allow the verdict and judgment to stand. 
In their argument in Point I the defendants finally con-
tend that any act of Clyde Cox was twice removed from the 
injury to the plaintiff. They state: "Not only do we have the 
intervening negligence of the defendant Hal Anderson, but 
we have the conduct of the plaintiff * * * ." 
We do not believe that the defendants seriously contend 
that the negligence of Hal Anderson was an intervening cause. 
The defendant Cox cannot excuse his negligence because 
of the negligence of Hal Anderson. The negligence of Hal 
Anderson and of Clyde Cox were concurrent causes. The 
test in determining whether or not it is a concurrence of causes 
is simply: could the accident have happened without their 
cooperation? See Sherman and Redfield on Negligence, Vol. 
1, Sec. 39, page 106. In his case if either Hal Anderson had 
put on the brakes or if Clyde Cox had not loaded the truck 
without checking the brakes the accident would not have 
happened. 
The Restatement of Torts, Section 452, discusses the prob-
lem of a third person's failure to prevent harm. Comment 
(a) states: 
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"The fact that the third person has failed to perform 
his duty to protect the other from harm threatened 
by the actor's negligence, implies that had the duty 
been performed, it would have prevented the actor's 
negligence from causing the harm which resulted from 
it. In order that there can be a failure of a duty of 
protection the person owing it must have either the 
opportunity to p~erform it or at least he should have 
had an opportunity had he been reasonably attentive 
to his surroundings. The third person's failure to per-
form his duty in this respect makes him concurrently 
liable with the negligent actor for any harm which 
results from the actor's negligence which would have 
have been prevented by the third person's duty." 
The law is well settled in Utah that a defendant is not 
relieved from liability merely because some other cause operated 
with the negligence of the defendant to produce the injury. 
Massachusetts Bonding and Insurance Company vs. Cudahy 
Packing Company, 61 Utah 116, 211 Pac. 706; United States 
vs. First Security Bank of Utah, 208 Fed. (2nd) 424; Caperon 
vs. Tuttle, 100 Utah 476, 116 Pac. (2nd) 402. 
The Supreme Court of the State of Washington followed 
the same rule in the case of Seibly vs. City of Sunnyside, 
(Wash) 35 Pac. (2nd) 56. 
The Supreme Court of the State of California in the case 
of Taylor vs. Oakland Scavanger Co. (Calif) 100 Pac. (2nd) 
1044, states the Rule as follows: 
"If an injury is produced by the concurrent effect 
of two separate wrongful acts, each is a proximate 
cause of the injury, and either can operate as an effi-
cient intervening cause with regard to the other. * * * 
The fact that neither party could reasonably anticipate 
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the concurrence of the other concurrent cause will not 
shield him from liability so long as his own negligence 
was one of the causes of the in jury." (Citing cases.) 
The defendants base their argument with regard to the 
negligence of Clyde Cox and also as to the contributory negli-
gence of Steven West upon the proposition "that if Steven 
West could assume that the truck was securely braked that 
Clyde Cox was entitled to the same assumption. The defend-
ants cite no case to support this theory and we find none. 
However, we will discuss the question in connection with the 
next point. 
POINT II 
THE PLAINTIFF, STEVEN WEST, WAS NOT GUlL TY 
OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER OF 
LAW IN SITTING DOWN BY THE SIDE OF THE MAIN 
TRAVELED WAY ON A PILE OF COAL WITHOUT BE-
ING ATTENTIVE MERELY BECAUSE THE JURY FOUND 
CLYDE COX GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE, BECAUSE, THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE ACTS AND 
FAILURE TO ACT OF COX AND THE CIRCUMSTANCES 
SURROUNDING THE ACTS OF WEST WERE ENTIRELY 
DIFFERENT. 
The defendants base their argument with regard to the 
contributory negligence of Steven West primarily upon the 
proposition that Steven West and Clyde Cox were aware of the 
same situation. In defendants' brief (page 22) or as stated 
in defendant's brief page '3•2. 
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"Therefore they are saying what should have been 
apparent to the defendants as reasonable and prudent 
men should not have been apparent to the plaintiff 
under the same circumstances as a reasonable and pru-
dent man." 
Then basing their reasoning upon this premise conclude: 
"that if under these circumstances Cox was negli-
gent, then West must have also been contributorily 
negligent as a matter of law." (Page 33 defendants' 
brief.) 
We submit that there can be merit to defendants' argu-
ment if, but only if, the facts of the case were such that the 
circumstances are the same and are equally apparent to both. 
That is not true in this case. There was a similarity of situation 
only up to the point where Hal Anderson got out of the truck. 
Cox directed Anderson to park the truck as he did and West 
heard the truck backing in. Beyond that point West's negli-
gence, if any, was inattentiveness. He testified that he did not 
know what was going on. The evidence is clear that his hat 
was down over his eyes and he was inattentive. However, 
as to Cox, he saw Hal Anderson leave the truck and go down 
to talk to his brother. Further, he was in a position where he 
could see that Hal Anderson had left the wheels turned in a 
downhill position. He knew that Hal Anderson was the driver 
of the truck and was a young man-an apparent youth: Cox 
knew of the position of the truck and its relation to the grade. 
None of these things were known to West inasmuch as he 
was, in fact, inattentive. The only issue which was submitted 
to the jury with regard to the negligence of Steve West was 
question No. 3, and that was whether or not West was negli-
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gent m occupying the pos1t10n where he was injured. The 
only contention made by the defendants in the pleadings or 
pretrial order as finally decided upon, was that 
"The plaintiff was himself guilty of contributory 
negligence which proximately contributed to cause his 
injuries and damages in that the said plaintiff seated 
himself in an inattentive position downhill and slightly 
to the left of and in front of the truck being loaded." 
(R-43). 
Thus, we submit, the contributory negligence, if any, of 
Steven West must be considered with regard to the situation 
as it existed as to him and not with regard to the situation 
as it existed to Clyde Cox. The defendants cite the Restatement 
of the Law of Torts, Sec. 340, Page 927, and a number of cases 
which stand for the general proposition that as stated in the 
Restatement of the Law of Torts: 
"A possessor of land is not subject to liability to his 
licencees, whether business visitors or gratuitous li-
censees, for bodily harm caused to them by any danger-
ous condition thereon, whether natural or artificiaf, if 
they know of the condition and realize the risk involved 
therein." 
In the case of Hooton, et al, vs. City of Burley, (Idaho) 
219 Pac. (2nd) 651, cited by the defendants as particularly 
applicable to this case, the defendant had left some bare 
electrical wires. The plaintiff saw the wires flashing and was 
cognizant of the danger involved. The case merely announces 
the general rule that where a plaintiff voluntarily exposes 
himself to a danger he is precluded from recovery. The case 
of Murray vs. Ralph R'Oench Co., (Mo.) 147 S.W. 2nd 623, 
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13 Negligence Cases, 638 involves a wet spot on a floor which 
plaintiff testified she saw and was pointed out to her on her 
entrance to the premises. Kitchen vs. Women's City Club 
(Mass.} 66 N.E. 554, involved a situation where the plaintiff 
slipped on a highly polished qardwood floor. As stated in 
the case: 
"The plaintiff knew all the conditions of which she 
complains, she knew that light rugs when stepped on 
may be expected to slip on slippery floors." 
In the case of Wold vs. Ogden City, et al (Utah) 258, 
P 2nd 453, the court emphasized the fact that the plaintiff 
knew of the hazard, an open trench. The rules announced in 
these cases, we submit, are not helpful in deciding the issues 
involved in this case. Each involves a situation where the 
plaintiff assumed the risk of a known danger. The defendants 
cite two other cases: Scofield vs. Sprouse-Reitz Company, 
(Utah) 265 Pac. (2nd) 396, and Knox vs. Snow (Utah) 229 
P. 2nd 874. Each of these cases involved a situation where the 
plaintiff falls into an easily observable hazard. These cases 
we submit have no application here. 
Restatement of the Law of Torts Sec. 466 recognizes two 
types of contributory negligence. The section states: 
"The plaintiff's contributory negligence may be 
either 
(a) an intentional and unreasonable exposure of 
himself to danger created by the defendant's negli-
gence, of which danger the plaintiff knows or has reason 
to know, or 
(b) conduct which, in respects other than those stated 
in Clause (a), fall short of the standard to which the 
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reasonable man should conform in order to protect 
himself from harm. 
Comment (c) under said section discusses the type of 
negligence in clause (a) as follows: 
"In order that the plaintiff's conduct may be con-
tributory negligence of the sort described in Clause (a), 
the plaintiff must know of the physical condition created 
by the defendant's negligence and must have knowl-
edge of such facts that, as a reasonable man, he should 
realize the danger involved. Furthermore, the plaintiff 
must intentionally expose himself to this danger. He 
must have the purpose to place himself within reach 
of it. It is not enough that his failure to exercise rea-
sonable attention to his surroundings prevents him 
from observing the danger, or that lack of reasonable 
preparation or competence prevents him from avoiding 
it when the condition created by the defendant is 
known to him." 
Comment (g) under said section discusses the type of 
negligence described in clause (b) as follows: 
"The negligence dealt with in Clause (b) usually 
consists of plaintiff's failure to pay reasonable attention 
to his surroundings so as to discover the danger created 
by the defendant's negligence or to exercise reasonable 
competence, care, diligence, and skill to avoid the 
danger when it is perceived, or to make such prepara-
tions as a reasonable man would regard as necessary 
to enable him to avoid the possible future danger. Such 
negligence is negligence of inadvertance and will, for 
convenience, be hereinafter described as casual negli-
gence to distinguish it from the type of negligence 
dealt with in Clause (a) which is herein called assump-
tion of risk and consists in the plaintiff's voluntary 
and unreasonable exposure of himself to a known 
danger." 
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The law an_d cases cited by the defendants under Point II 
involve the type of negligence discussed in Clause (a). The 
negligence of Steve West, if any, can only be negligence of 
inadvertence as discussed in Clause (b). At the time Steve 
West assumed the position that he did no danger existed. 
Furthermore, the only evidence in the record with regard to 
the custom as to where men would sit while waiting to be 
loaded was to the effect that they sat wherever they felt like 
and on other occasions had been observed to sit in the same 
place or the same vicinity where Steve West was sitting when 
he was injured (R-325). Also the same day that West was 
in jured Cox testified he saw other men at the same place as 
Steve West (R-185). 
There is no evidence in the record to show that Steve 
West had any reason to apprehend any danger and we submit 
therefore that he cannot be found guilty of contributory negli-
gence. The Supreme Court of the State of Wyoming in the case 
of VanHorn vs. Wyoming Game and Fish Commission (Wyo) 
92 Pac. (2nd) 560, 562, states this principal as follows: 
"Here we think the more pertinent principal ap-
plicable is as held in Chicago Telephone Company vs. 
Commercial Union Assurance Company, Ltd., of Lon-
don, 131 Ill. App. 248, that the doctrine of contribu-
tory negligence does not apply where it appears that 
the omission or conduct alleged to constitute contribu-
tory negligence was in the doing or the not doing of 
some act or acts in relation to a danger not reasonably 
to have been apprehended. In the opinion in that case 
the decision in Ingall vs. Smith, 82 Mich. 1, 7, 46 N.W. 
21, was quoted to this effect: 'It is a sound rule of law 
that it is not contributory negligence not to look out for 
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danger when there is no reason to apprehend any.' 
Beach Contrib. Neg. 41." 
The jury under special interrogatory found that Steven 
L. West was not guilty of negligence in assuming the position 
he did. This finding under the facts and circumstances of 
this case we submit should not be disturbed by the court upon 
appeal. The Utah Supreme Court has long recognized the 
rule that contributory negligence is generally a question of 
fact for the jury. In the case of Hone vs. Mammoth Mining 
Company, (Utah) 27 U. 168, 176, the court held as follows: 
"This court held in Holland vs. Oregon Shortline 
Railway Company, 26 Utah 209, 212, 72 P. 940, that 
'contributory negligence is a question of law only when 
the testimony is not conflicting, and is such as permits 
no reasonable difference of opinion as to its effect; but, 
whenever there is doubt as to the facts, it is the province 
of the jury to determine the question, or, whenever 
there may reasonably be a difference of opinion as to the 
inference and conclusions from the facts, it is likewise 
a question for the jury. It belongs to the jury not only 
to weigh the evidence and find upon the questions of 
fact, but to draw conclusions as well, alike from dis-
puted and undisputed facts.'' 
"This court, in the case of Linder vs. Anchor Mining 
Company, 20 Utah 134, 148, 58 Pac. 355, 358, held in 
the opinion delivered by Mr. Justice McCarty, that: 'It 
is well settled that, where there is uncertainty as to the 
existence of either negligence or contributory negli-
gence, the question is not one of law but of fact, and to 
be settled by a jury; and this whether the uncertainty 
arises from a conflict in the testimony, or, because the 
facts being undisputed, fair minded men will honestly 
draw different conclusions from them." 
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In view of the fact, that in this case there was no apparent 
danger to Steven West and that at the time he assumed the 
position he did there was no activity whatever, reasonable 
minds might differ as to whether or not he was contributorily 
negligent in assuming the position he did and remaining in-
attentive to what was going on. The question was properly 
submitted to the jury. The Supreme Court of Utah in the case 
of Martin vs. Stevens (Utah), 243 Pac. (2nd) 747, at page 
7 49 states the rule as follows: 
"The question of contributory negligence is usually 
for the jury and the court should be reluctant to take 
consideration of this question of fact from it. Neilson 
vs. Mauchley, Utah 202 P. 2nd 547; Toomers Estate 
vs. Union Pacific Railway Co., (Utah) 239 P 2d 163, 
The expressions in those cases are in accord with this 
uniformly accepted doctrine. The right to trial by jury 
should be safeguarded. Before the issue of contributory 
negligence may be taken from the jury, the defendant's 
burden of proving both (a) that plaintiff was guilty of 
contributory negligence, and (b) that such negligence 
proximately contributed to cause his own injury, must 
be met, and established with such certainty that reason-
able minds could not find to the contrary; conversely, 
if there is any reasonable basis, either because of lack 
of evidence, or from the evidence and the fair inferences 
arising therefrom, taken in the light most favorable 
to the plaintiff, upon which reasonable minds may 
conclude that they are not convinced by a preponder-
ance of the evidence rather (a) that plaintiff was 
guilty of contributory negligence or (b) that such 
negligence proximately contributed to the cause of 
the injury, the plaintiff is entitled to have the question 
submitted to the jury." 
The defendants finally contend that as a matter of law 
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under the evidence neither the defendant, Cox nor the plain-
tiff, West, were negligent in failing to anticipate Hal Ander-
son's negligence. With this proprosition we agree in part. 
Failure to anticipate negligence of another which results in 
an injury, is not contributory negligence and will not defeat 
the action. McCulloch vs. Horton (Mont.), 56 Pac. (2nd) 
1344. However, this is not the negligence involved in this 
case. The jury found Cox negligent in failing to ascertain 
that the brakes on the truck were applied before he started 
to load the truck and that this was a proximate cause of the 
accident. They found that Steve West was not negligent in 
assuming the position he did and remaining inattentive. We 
submit, therefore, that because the jury found Cox guilty of 
negligence it does not follow that West was guilty of con-
tributory negligence as a matter of law. 
POINT III 
THE INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN BY THE TRIAL COURT 
DO N 0 T OVER-ACCENTUATE THE PLAINTIFF'S 
THEORY, BECAUSE, SUCH INSTRUCTIONS WERE 
GIVEN TO ENABLE THE JURY TO ANSWER THE 
SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES SUBMITTED TO THEM. 
Under Point III in defendants' brief, the defendants have 
discussed a number of contentions wherein they claim the 
court erred in its instructions and for convenience we have 
broken this point down into four points and will discuss them 
in the same order as discussed in defendants' brief. 
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The defendants contend that the court instructions placed 
undue emphasis on the plaintiff's theory of the case and did 
not give equal emphasis to the theory of the defendants. The 
instructions in this case must be considered in light of the 
fact that the issues were submitted to the jury on special 
interrogatories. Rule 49 (a) U.R.C.P., provides in part as 
follows: 
"The court shall give to the jury such explanation 
and instruction concerning the matter thus submitted 
as may be necessary to enable the jury to make its find-
ings upon each issue." 
Professor James William Moore in Moore's Federal Prac-
tice, Vol. 5, Page 2207, in discussing the instruction of a jury 
under a special verdict states as follows: 
"Use of the special verdict eliminates the necessity 
for and use of complicated instructions on the law, 
which are a normal concomitant of the general verdict. 
Complicated instructions have always been ludicrous 
and vicious; ludicrous in that only the naive can be-
lieve lay juries are capable of absorbing all the legal 
elements involved; vicious in that lack of comprehen-
sion leads to confusion and ultimately, injustice. When 
the special verdict is used the court should give to the 
jury only such explanation and instructions as it deems 
necessary to enable the jury to make intelligent find-
ings upon the issues of facts submitted." 
The instructions given with regard to Hal Anderson's 
negligence i.e. Instructions 10 and 11 cited by the plaintiff in 
support of their theory that the court over-emphasized the 
plaintiff's theory of the case were necessarily given in order 
to enable th jury to make their findings with regard to the 
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negligence of Hal Anderson. The defendants do not claim 
that they are erroneous in stating the law but merely that they 
over-emphasized the duty of the defendants and particularly 
that they over-emphasized the duty of Clyde Cox. Such con-
tention, we submit, is without merit. The court must of neces-
sity instruct the jury with regard to each of the special inter-
rogatories submitted. The defendants cite the case of Devine 
vs. Cook, 279 Pac. (2d) 1073, in support of their theory that 
the court in this case over emphasized or over accentuated 
the plaintiff's theory of the case. However, an analysis of this 
case and the other cases therein cited indicates that the over 
accentuation discussed in those cases is the giving of multiple 
and complicated instructions on the same subject. Such was 
not done in this case. 
The defendants further claim and cite Divine vs. Cook, 
supra, as authority that it is error to have the instruction per-
taining to one party to be given in a positive manner and those 
pertaining to another given in a negative manner. This propo-
sition, we also submit, is not applicable to the case at bar. 
Instruction No. 12 with regard to the duty of Clyde Cox 
merely places upon Clyde Cox a duty to use reasonable care 
to avoid harming Steve West and that he was obligated to 
conduct himself as a reasonably prudent man. Paragraph two 
of the Instruction merely sets forth the conditions which the 
jury was entitled to consider under the evidence in determin-
ing whether or not Clyde Cox did act as a reasonably prudent 
man. There is no positive instruction that if Clyde Cox did 
not check the brakes he would be guilty of negligence. This 
fact was left for the determination of the jury under an m-
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struction which we claim to be proper. On the other hand In-
struction No. 13 with regard to the contributory negligence 
of Steve West states in a postive manner that Steven L. West 
would be guilty of negligence in assuming the position he did 
without keeping an outlook for his own safety. The defendants 
complain of this last phrase, however, the evidence was un-
disputed that he did not keep an outlook for his own safety 
and thus the instruction given amounts to a positive instruc-
tion that Steve West would be negligent if an ordinarily pru-
dent man could have foreseen that the truck while being loaded 
might be set in motion and that it would likely run upon the 
general area where Steve West was reclining. Instruction 12, 
we submit, was necessary and sufficient to enable the jury to 
make the determination as to whether or not Steve West was 
contributorily negligent. 
The only proper theory upon which the defendants could 
rely was, that Clyde Cox was not negligent; that he acted as 
a reasonably prudent man would under the circumstances of 
the case; and that Steven West was guilty of contributory 
negligence. The special interrogatories and instructions, as 
given, submitted this theory to the jury. 
The defendants set forth on page 46 of their brief In-
struction No. 10 and assert that such Instruction states the 
correct rule of law applicable to the case and that it sets forth 
the defendant's theory of the case. A perusal of the instructions 
indicates that it is erroneous. The instruction as requested gives 
to Clyde Cox an absolute right to assume that the brakes were 
securely set so as to hold the truck in place during the loading 
operation. As pointed out in Point I of plaintiff's brief, such 
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is not the law and it would have been error to give Instruction 
No. 10. 
The special verdict, as submitted to the jury in part II, sets 
forth the facts to be determined by the jury with regard to 
Clyde Cox's negligence and part III sets forth the question 
of Steve West's contributory negligence; The instructions, 
as given, do nothing more than enable the jury to intelligently 
answer these questions. Thus, we submit, there is no error 
prejudicial to the defendants. 
POINT IV 
THE SUBMISSION OF THE SPECIAL INTERROGA-
TORY TO THE JURY REGARDING THE LOSS OF EARN-
ING CAPACITY OF STEVEN L. WEST WAS PROPER 
BECAUSE THE TESTIMONY OF MR. WEST AND THE 
TESTIMONY OF THE DOCTOR WHO ATTENDED MR. 
WEST SUPPORTED THE SUBMISSION OF THE QUES-
TION OF LOSS OF YEARLY EARNING CAPACITY TO 
THE JURY. 
The defendants excepted to the giving of that portion 
of Instruction 17 which submitted the question of the loss 
of Steven L. West's earning capacity to the jury and also 
special interrogatories No. VI and VII on the grounds that 
there was no evidence in the record that Steven West sustained 
a loss of earning capacity as a result of the accident. The 
defendants contend in their statement of facts and in their brief 
on page 39 that the only evidence in the record on the point 
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of Steven L. West's earning capacity was that the plaintiff 
earned $2,600.00 per annum for the year 1952 as disclosed 
by his income tax returns and $2,400.00 during the year 1951, 
but since his recovery he had been earning $300.00 per month. 
They make the further assertion that there is no evidence 
in the record whatsoever that he was qualified for or could 
earn in excess of $300.00 per month were it not for his in-
juries. Such contention we submit is without merit. Mr. West 
testified (R-336) that during the year 1951 he worked on and 
off for a period of about five months and that the rest of the 
time he was prospecting. That the prospecting produced him 
no income. This evidence alone, we submit, is sufficient to 
allow the jury to make a determinaton as to Mr. West's loss 
of earning capacity. If a plaintiff uses his time for any valu-
able purpose, though he doesn't actually earn any money by it, 
he should be allowed the reasonable value thereof. District 
of Columbia vs. Woodbury, 136 U. S. 450, 10 S. Ct. 990. If 
a further evidence of Mr. West's earning capacity be necessary, 
he testified (R-334) that he could and did in some months 
gross as much as $800.00 per month. His testimony also indi-
cates that he could make four trips per week and make a net 
profit on each trip of $45.00. Based upon three trips per week 
wherein he would gross $60.00 per trip or a total or $180.00 
and his expenses for three trips being $45.00, Mr. West would 
net $135.00 per week or an average of $540.00 per month. 
The testimony of Dr. Hubbard (R-238, 239), makes it clear 
that Steven West will never be able to do heavy work again. 
Dr. Hubbard testified as follows: 
"Q Do you think he will ever be able to do that 
type of work ? 
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A He won't be able to do that heavy trucking. No. 
Q And for how long, at any time? Will he ever be 
able to do it again? 
A Well, I thing the trucker the way-of course, I 
maybe don't understand that but he won't be able to do 
any heavy physical work that he has done in the past. 
Q As long as he lives, is that correct? 
A Yes, sir, that means that. I mean the heavy lift-
ing, truck work, heavy physical work, shoveling or 
scooping or the type of work they do would do that." 
Such evidence is sufficient to sustain the jury's findings 
as to Steven L. West's loss of earning capacity and it was not 
error to submit this issue to the jury. 
POINT V 
THE COURT'S INSTRUCTION, NUMBER 9 (a) RE-
GARDING THE RIGHT TO RELY ON DUE CARE OF 
ANOTHER, AND NUMBER 12 REGARDING CIRCUM-
STANCES TO BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING 
ORDINARY CARE OF COX, ARE NOT CONTRADIC-
TORY INSTRUCTIONS BECAUSE CLYDE COX DID 
NOT HAVE AN ABSOLUTE RIGHT TO RELY UPON 
THE ASSUMPTION THAT HAL ANDERSON WOULD 
NOT BE NEGLIGENT, BUT COULD ONLY SO RELY 
UNTIL SOME ACT WAS DONE BY HAL ANDERSON 
TO INDICATE TO THE CONTRARY OR THE CIRCUM-
STANCES INDICATED THAT HAL ANDERSON MIGHT 
BE NEGLIGENT. 
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The defendants in arguing that the court's Instructions 
Nos. 9 a and 12 are contradictory base their assumption upon 
an erroneous interpretation of the law, i.e., that Clyde Cox 
was entitled to absolutely rely upon the non-negligence of 
Hal Anderson. As heretofore discussed in Point I, such is 
not the law. Even as given, Instruction No. 9a, gives Clyde 
Cox the right to rely upon the assumption that Hal Anderson 
would not be negligent only until some act was done by Hal 
Anderson to indicate to the contrary. 
Viewed in the light of the true rule that Clyde Cox was 
entitled to rely upon Hal Anderson only if a reasonably pru-
dent man would have done so under the circumstances, the 
two instructions herein involved are not contradictory in that 
Instruction No. 12 or the paragraph of which the defendants 
complain merely sets forth the facts and circumstances of 
the case which could be considered by the jury in determining 
whether or not Clyde Cox acted as a reasonably prudent man 
under the circumstances. The cases of Konold vs. Rio Grande 
Western Railway (Utah) 21 Utah 379, 60 Pac. 1021; Jensen 
z·s. Utah Railway (Utah), 72 Utah 376, 270 Pac. 349, and 
State vs. Waid (Utah), 92 Utah 279, 67 Pac. (2d) 647, are 
cases in which the instructions, as given, were in irreconcilable 
conflict on a material point and, of course, such instructions 
were held to be error. However, in the case at bar the instruc-
tions, as given, can be reconciled. Clyde Cox was entitled to 
the assumption that Hal Anderson would not be negligent 
only until some act was done on his part to indicate to the 
contrary. While we submit this is not the true rule of law, 
it was to the defendants' benefit that it was given in such a 
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restnchve manner. Under the instructions the jury was en-
titled to determine. first whether or not there was some act on 
the part of Hal Anderson which would put Clyde Cox on 
notice that he might have been negligent. Once having made 
this determination under Instruction 9a the jury was then 
entitled to determine whether or not Clyde Cox failed to use 
ordinary care and were entitled to consider the circumstances 
as set forth in Instruction No. 12. Viewed in this light, we 
submit that there is no conflict in the instructions. They are 
not contradictory and are not irreconcilable and therefore the 
cases cited do not require a reversal on this ground. 
The question as to whether or not Hal Anderson com-
mitted some act or did some act which would put Clyde Cox on 
notice of his negligence was not submitted to the jury nor did 
the court make a finding thereon. The defendants did not re-
quest that such an issue be submitted and therefore if such find-
ing is necessary to support the verdict of the jury, such finding 
shall be deemed to have been made in accordance with the 
judgment on the special verdict. Rule 49 (a) U.R.C.P. The 
last sentence provides in part as follows: 
"As to an issue omitted without such demand the 
court may make a finding; or, if it fails to do so, it 
shall be deemed to have made a finding in accord with 
the judgment on the special verdict. 
POINT VI 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN 
THE GIVING AND THE FAILURE TO GIVE THE IN-
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STRUCTIONS COMPLAINED OF BY THE DEFENDANT 
BECAUSE IN SUBMITTING A CASE TO THE JURY ON 
SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES, ONLY SUCH INSTRUC-
TIONS AS WILL ENABLE THE JURY TO INTELLIGENT-
LY ANSWER THE INTERROGATORIES NEED BE GIVEN. 
The defendants complain of the failure of the court to 
give certain instructions requested and not heretofore dis-
cussed. Defendants request No. 15 is the usual instruction 
given in a general verdict case. However, bearing in mind 
that this case was submitted on written interrogatories such 
instruction would have served no useful purposes. The Court 
in Instructions No. 17 as given (R-125) instructed the jury 
in part as follows: 
"Before you answer the question pertaining to dam-
ages in your special verdict you ought to report to the 
court to see if it is necessary to answer these questions." 
The jury did not follow this instruction but continued 
and answered all of the interrogatories. (See remarks of the 
court, (R-498) . The jury answered the questions with regard 
to negligence and contributory negligence first and the failure 
to report back to the court to determine whether or not it 
was necessary to answer the questions on damages cannot 
or was not prejudicial to the defendants herein. Defendants 
also complain that their Instruction No. 6 (R-104) submitting 
the issue of unavoidable accident was not given. The issue 
of unavoidable accident was not submitted to the jury nor 
was it requested by the defendants that the issue be submitted. 
The issue of inevitable or unavoidable acciodent is submitted 
to the jury only where the evidence tends to show that the 
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injury resulted from some cause other than the negligence of 
the parties. The rule is stated in 65 CJS 1192, Sec. 264 (e) as 
follows: 
"Ordinarily the issue of inevitable or unavoidable 
accident should be submitted to the jury where it is 
raised by the evidence; and such issue is raised when, 
and only when, there is evidence tending to prove that 
the injury resulted from some cause other than the 
negligence of the parties. It is not raised and may not 
be submitted for consideration by the jury where either 
party was guilty of negligence in the situation which 
resulted in the injury, or if there is no evidence tending 
to prove that something other than the negligence of 
one of the parties caused the injury complained of; 
and the fact that the action is against two alleged 
tort-feasors does not alter the rule, since a dispute in 
the evidence as to whether the injuries resulted alone 
from the negligence of one of the defendants presents 
a question of sole proximate cause and not a question 
of unavoidable accident." 
Defendants' requested Instruction No. 7 (R-105) could 
have been proper only if the verdict had been a general verdict. 
The jury was instructed on proximate cause in Instruction 
No.9. Under such instruction the jury could have answered the 
special interrogatories in such a manner as to find that the 
negligence of Hal Anderson was the sole proximate cause of 
the accident. This they did not do. 
It is not necessary in .submitting special interrogatories 
to the jury that the jury be instructed on the general law of 
the case. Only such instructions should be given as necessary 
to enable the jury to answer the special interrogatories. This 
rule is set forth in 88 C. J.S. 8 3·7, Sec. 317, as follows: 
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"Where a case is submitted to the jury for a special 
verdict or on special issues it is unnecessary and erro-
neous to instruct the jury generally as to the law of 
the case, but instructions as to general rules of law 
should be given as far as they are reasonably necessary 
to enable the jury to answer the special questions in-
telligently and in accordance with the law." 
See also 53 Am. Jur. 493-, Sec. 638, as follows: 
"Where a special verdict is required, it is improper 
to instruct the jury generally concerning the law of 
the case, for the reason that inasmuch as the jury are 
not to apply the law to the facts. instructions as to 
the law can serve no useful purpose. In such case the 
instructions should be confined to matters as are neces-
sary to inform the jury as to the issue made by the 
pleadings, and the rules for weighing and reconciling 
testimony, who has the burden of proof as to the 
facts to be found, and whatever else may be necessary 
to enable the jury clearly to understand their duties 
concerning such special verdict, and the facts to be 
found therein." 
The defendants complain that the gtvmg of court In-
struction No. 17 required the jury to return a verdict for th~ 
plaintiff. Particular reference is made to the last part of the 
instruction where the court advised the jury that he would 
apply a mathematical formula. We must keep in mind that the 
issues were submitted to the jury on special interrogatory and 
not a general verdict. The jury in this case had determined the 
questions of negligence and contributory negligence prior to 
the time they considered the question of damages and even 
assuming that the instruction did require the jury to make 
the findings complained of such fact does not prejudice the 
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defendants. ·It is the court that enters the judgment and de-
termines the amount of the verdict. 
In this case the court instructed the jury properly to 
enable them to answer all of the questions propounded and 
the giving and the· failure to give the instructions complained 
of by the defendants was not error. 
CONCLUSION 
The defendants' approach to the problems herein involved 
and the defendants' entire argument is based upon the erroneous 
premise that Clyde Cox had an absolute right to rely upon 
the fact that Hal Anderson would not be negligent and that 
the brakes had been securely set and that the truck would 
not move when he commenced to load it. Under the law and 
even under the instructions of the court, as given, Clyde Cox 
had this right only until he was put on notice to the contrary. 
The jury by its answers to the special interrogatories and the 
trial court by its judgment found Clyde Cox guilty of negli-
gence and Steven West free from contributory negligence. 
They found that some act on the part of Hal Anderson ap-
prised Cox that Anderson had not taken the precautions 
necessary to insure the safety of the truck. 
In the interest of accuracy we would point out that the 
American Fuel Company is not a corporation as stated by the 
defendants in their brief, page 48. 
The defendants have had the advantage which a special 
verdict necessarily gives to a defendant. They imply that the 
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Jury was sympathetic to the plaintiff because of the severe 
injuries and for that reason returned a verdict for the plaintiff. 
Such, we submit, is not the case. The jury answered questions 
of ultimate fact and did not return a general verdict. 
We respectfully submit that in view of the foregoing 
authorities and arguments that the judgment of the trial court 
based upon special interrogatories of the jury should not be 
set aside upon appeal. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ANDERSON AND TAYLOR 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and 
Respondent Steven L. West 
345 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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